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Abstract 
As a construct, the elaboration of countertransference experience (ECE) is intended to depict 
the implicit and explicit psychological work to which therapists submit their experiences with 
clients. Through ECE, defined as a mentalizing process of a particular kind, therapists’ 
experiences are presumed to acquire and increase in mental quality and become available for 
meaning-making and judicious clinical use. In this paper, we claim that such an ongoing 
process facilitates engagement with common therapeutic factors, such as the therapeutic 
alliance and countertransference management, enhancing therapist responsiveness in 
psychotherapy. We synthesize relevant literature on countertransference, mentalization, and, 
in particular, therapists’ mentalization, informed by a systematic literature review. As a result, 
we propose a model for assessing ECE in psychotherapy, comprising 6 diversely mentalized 
countertransference positions (factual-concrete, abstract-rational, projective-impulsive, 
argumentative, contemplative-mindful, mentalizing), 2 underlying primary dimensions 
(experiencing, reflective elaboration), and 5 complementary dimensions of elaboration. 
Strengths and limitations of the model are discussed. 
 
Key Practitioner Message 
 What therapists experience with clients within and between sessions is an important 
component of psychotherapy process across therapeutic models 
 Elaboration of these experiences may facilitate engagement with common factors of 
psychotherapy, such as alliance and countertransference management, and enhance 
therapists’ responsiveness to the emerging needs of each singular client 
 This psychological work can be studied and understood with help from a model 
describing predominant mental attitudes towards experience (countertransference 
positions) and different dimensions of elaboration of that experience 
 
Keywords: countertransference, mentalization, therapist factors, therapeutic 
relationship, common factors 
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Mentalizing Countertransference? A Model for Research on the Elaboration of 
Countertransference Experience in Psychotherapy 
From a relational standpoint, therapists’ experiences in and between sessions may 
shape important aspects of process and outcome across psychotherapy schools. However, the 
prevailing concern in psychotherapy pertains to clients’ experiences and how to address them. 
 In this paper, we focus on the implicit and explicit psychological work to which 
therapists’ experiences are submitted, naming it the elaboration of countertransference 
experience (ECE). We intend to operationalize this process for research purposes. To this end, 
we start with a brief outline of the concept of countertransference (CT) and propose a 
synthesis of previous theorizations through a four-component view of CT experience. In order 
to conceptualize ECE, we frame it in the previous work on CT management (Gelso & Hayes, 
2007) and propose a shift in focus from management to elaboration, describing the latter as a 
particular form of mentalization (Fonagy, Bateman, & Luyten, 2012; Lecours & Bouchard, 
1997). Following a review of the mentalization construct and research on therapist’s 
mentalization informed by a systematic literature review, we finally present our 
operationalization of ECE, a model describing six diversely mentalized CT positions, two 
underlying primary dimensions, and five complementary dimensions/facets of elaboration. 
We claim that successful CT management, considered a promising therapeutic element 
in evidence-based research (Norcross, 2011), requires and largely operates through ECE, 
which in turn can facilitate other well established common factors of psychotherapy and 
enhance therapists’ responsiveness to the emerging needs of singular clients. To the extent 
that most of the studied common factors explicitly involve therapists handling emotional 
states and relational processes in-session (e.g., alliance development and rupture repairing, 
empathy, positive regard, congruence), it is our belief that the type of psychological work 
depicted in ECE is involved. Furthermore, findings highlighting the importance of therapist 
effects in psychotherapy outcomes are robust, but the understanding of what such effects are 
made of is still in its first steps (Wampold, 2015). It seems reasonable to presume that 
relevant differences across therapists and within particular therapists’ cases may rely on the 
successful use of common factors and, thus, on ECE and its vicissitudes. 
Countertransference: Converging and Contending Views 
Historically, CT was initially seen as a disturbance and later as an instrument of 
psychoanalytic work, depending on its construal as therapist’s reactions stemming from 
unresolved neurotic conflicts (classical view) or his or her global emotional response to a 
particular patient, correlative of the latter’s unconscious experiences (totalistic view) (e.g., 
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Gelso & Hayes, 2007). Additionally, a more recent trend often called constructivist tends to 
focus on a “third” entity created by each unique dyad and examine transference and CT as a 
function of this “field” (see M. J. Diamond, 2014; Gabbard, 2001). 
Yet, a common ground emerged concerning a number of assumptions about CT, 
within and beyond psychoanalysis (Gelso & Hayes, 2007; Kiesler, 2001), namely: (a) the 
inevitability of CT phenomena in all therapeutic processes, even from a narrow conflict-based 
standpoint (Gelso & Hayes, 2007); (b) the acceptance of these phenomena as joint creation, 
despite variable emphasis on the relative contributions of therapist and client (Gabbard, 
2001); (c) the idea that they can hinder the therapeutic process, particularly when 
insufficiently recognized by therapists (Ligiéro & Gelso, 2002; Racker, 1968); and (d) that 
CT can be a useful tool, or at least not harmful, particularly to the extent that it is 
acknowledged, managed, and/or worked through (e.g., Ligiéro & Gelso, 2002). 
Important divergences remain, though, and empirical research on the field often 
addresses different classes of phenomena (Gelso & Hayes, 2007). Thus, a clear position is 
required from investigators. We now present our own view. 
A Model of Countertransference Experience 
Our view of CT experience echoes a totalistic position since it requires attending to 
and working with the total response to the patient. However, it discriminates four experiential 
components, derived from previous literature, to which different therapists may assign distinct 
clinical value: subjective CT, objective CT, therapeutic attitude, and emerging experience. 
 Subjective countertransference (SCt) (Keisler, 2001) refers to experiences deriving 
from the therapist’s conflicts and blind spots, as in the classical view and Gelso and Hayes’ 
(2007) extension of the concept. SCt may exert an unrecognized and involuntary relational 
pull on the patient and come out as detrimental CT behavior (Friedman & Gelso, 2000).  
Objective countertransference (OCt) (Winnicott, 1949; Kiesler, 2001) includes 
experiences stemming from “realistic/average expectable” complementary reactions to the 
patient’s interpersonal style, his or her relational pull, defensive operations employed, or the 
internal object relation activated (namely, the self or object representation projected onto the 
therapist) at a given moment. In our understanding of the concept, it may operate through 
processes previously described as introjective identification (Tansey & Burke, 1989) or 
projective counteridentification (Grinberg, 2001). 
Therapeutic attitude (TAt) refers to the usual mindset of a given therapist as a function 
of his or her particular theoretical approach to psychotherapy – which is part of a wider frame 
commonly designated as the therapeutic setting (Zachrisson, 2009). Examples include the so-
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called evenly-suspended/hovering attention (Freud, 1912/1958), for psychoanalysts; 
congruence, positive regard, and empathy (Rogers, 1957) for humanistic-experiential 
therapists; or a more rationalist, active, and directive stance among cognitive-behavioral 
therapists (McGinn & Sanderson, 2001). 
Finally, emerging experience (EEx) refers to the experience of a new interpersonal 
field (D. B. Stern, 2010), unfolding as the “real relationship” develops and takes shape, in 
which neither therapist’s nor client’s unresolved conflicts play the leading defining role, 
despite their inevitable participation. It is a relationship-specific emerging ground of 
experiences, as opposed to a predictable general pattern, and it includes the therapist’s 
experiences coming from (and constantly reshaping) the shared implicit relationship (D. N. 
Stern et al., 1998). The special quality of these EEx is not that they are more “real” or 
“rational”. To this respect, we prefer Morgan et al.’s (1998) idea that, although transference 
and SCt affect the therapeutic exchange, “what is experientially prominent in the here and 
now [of the real relationship] is the past the patient and therapist share together, rather than 
the past they share with other people.” (p. 326). In this sense, EEx is what accounts for the 
development of a new relationship, potentially providing corrective emotional experiences 
(Bernier & Dozier, 2002) or the rearrangement of implicit relational knowing (Lyons-Ruth et 
al., 1998). This is facilitated by the therapist’s abilities to unhook from and disconfirm1 
cognitive-interpersonal cycles (Bernier & Dozier, 2002; Kiesler, 2001; Safran & Muran, 
2000). 
These distinctions, though, don’t actually exist as such at the experiential level. They 
can be tentatively inferred, elaborated, or hypothesized through psychological work, but not 
before they are experienced as a whole. Besides, none of these experiential components is 
ever absent or inactive, and, as pointed by Levine (1997), they often share the same 
underlying psychological processes. Therefore, we prefer the assumption that any of the four 
components can be dominant at a certain point in time (acute CT experiences) or as an 
enduring relational pattern (chronic CT experiences); and that overlooking or disowning any 
of them is a threat to the therapeutic process (e.g., underestimating SCt may facilitate 
excessive acting-out on the therapist’s part and burden the patient; unawareness of the EEx 
may be a signal of an overly “saturated” [Bion, 1970] mental state within the therapist; etc.). 
                                                          
1
 Resonating with and expanding Strachey’s (1934/1969) formulation, we believe that whenever a therapist 
provides a mutative/reparative relational experience, a distinction emerges between what would be a patient’s 
transference-based expectancies and what comes to be a new “disconfirming” experience. 
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Conversely, overestimating any of these qualities of experience also proves problematic 
(excessively technical TAt, defensive or naïve selective focus on EEx, etc.). 
We then propose the term countertransference experience to refer to the range of 
phenomena we intend to investigate. In our view, the desirable methodological efforts to 
distinguish different components or sources of therapists’ (inter)subjective experiences with 
patients shouldn’t elude the fact that none of them can subsume the others, and that it is 
mainly through elaboration that each of them can be attended to and made available to inform 
clinical decision-making. We conceive of this psychological work as a meaning-making 
process in which the four components described must be held in mind as permanent 
generative working hypothesis. Like many others, we take meaning as both discovered and 
created, and meaning-making as a process in which mostly pre-conceptual felt experience 
constrains but does not fully determine meaning (Angus & Greenberg, 2011). This felt 
experience is regarded as being dialectically transformed through symbolization, in turn 
giving rise to new experience (in this sense, ECE is likely to expand EEx). Thus, ECE is 
proposed to be a dialectic, transformative, integrative, contextual, and agency-enhancing 
process of making “clinically relevant” sense of experience.2 
Elaboration of Countertransference Experience 
Managing and Elaborating Countertransference 
As stated earlier, with the construct of ECE we intend to conceptualize the therapist’s 
psychological work involved in the successful use of CT experience in psychotherapy across 
therapeutic models. We believe this is a relevant process mediating accurate clinical decision-
making. To our knowledge, though, little research has been done on such a process. 
Charles J. Gelso and Jeffrey A. Hayes’ pioneering work on CT management (CtM) 
(e.g., Gelso & Hayes, 2007) represents an exception. According to the authors, CtM is a 
process by which therapists try to prevent detrimental effects of CT, repair or minimize these 
effects, and use CT to benefit the work with patients. Five factors are expected to underlie 
successful CtM: therapist self-insight, self-integration, empathy, anxiety management, and 
conceptualizing skills (Hayes, Gelso, & Hummel, 2011). Among other results, the authors 
found support for what has been called a two-step model for CtM (Latts & Gelso, 1995) which 
involves, at first, the therapist becoming aware of his or her feelings, and then being able to 
interpret them within a theoretical framework. Evidence that conceptual ability in the absence 
                                                          
2
 We assume the coexistence of diversely structured/saturated ingredients of unconscious experience, some of 
which are dynamically defended against (e.g., Levine, 2012). Still, we choose to include the range of required 
modalities of psychological work under the broad designation of ECE, an ever-incomplete quest of making 
sense of the whole experiential field involving more than dealing with resistances. 
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of awareness of feelings produces high levels of CT behavior was interpreted as revealing that 
a “defensive use of theory” is ineffective in terms of CtM (Hayes et al., 2011). 
 We think CtM can be reappraised in some points. First, the two-step hypothesis may 
support a conceptualization of effective CtM as a cognitive-affective integrative process in 
which there is something more than strictly managing or regulating aroused experience – this 
“something more” being a dialectical process from which new meaning and new experience 
emerge (see EEx above). Second, we believe theory is not the exclusive cognitive resource 
participating in this process (reflection, personal memories, or personal beliefs are concurring 
instances). Finally, CtM research tends to assess trait-like correlates or factors rather than 
state-like actual constituents of CtM. Gelso, Fassinger, Gomez, and Latts (1995) refined an 
existing measure of the five factors mentioned above (Countertransference Factors Inventory; 
Hayes, Gelso, Van Wagoner, & Diemer, 1991) by only retaining items that directly address 
therapists’ work with clients. This, along with session-specific uses of the instrument in 
naturalistic studies, allows a more direct apprehension of CtM. Still, in our view, it remains 
closer to a person level than to a process level approach. For these reasons, we think it is 
useful to further conceptualize the actual psychological work performed by therapists towards 
CT experience. 
 We use the term elaboration inspired by McDougall’s (1985) broad sense in which 
two different kinds of mental labor taken out from Freud’s writings are included: working 
out/working over (psychische Verarbeitung) and working through (Durcharbeitung). 
According to Laplanche and Pontalis (2009), working out includes the transformation of 
“physical quantity into psychic quality” (p. 131, our translation) and subsequent associative or 
linking (Bindung) processes. We believe these are the processes that Bram and Gabbard 
(2001) qualify as mentalization in its broadest sense: “the ability to put words and images to 
somatic experience and integrate them in the service of creating psychological meaning” (p. 
688). Working through is a more restricted process, originally applied to analysands, that in 
simple terms involves dealing with resistances to insight, thus preventing repetition and 
leading to enduring psychological change (Freud, 1914/1958). In McDougall’s (1985) use of 
the term, which she applies to the analyst’s mental work, it seems to consist of a reflective 
effort to make sense of thoughts, feelings, and fantasies stirred up in him (made available by 
previous working out). So, in this sense, therapist’s elaboration can be seen as a process 
through which raw experience acquires (and increases in) mental quality and becomes 
available for meaning-making, involving a close interconnection and integration between 
implicit-spontaneous and explicit-reflective psychological processes. Again, this seems 
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coherent with the two-step model mentioned above. But now we are describing ECE as a 
process of mentalization, which calls for a consideration of this construct. 
Construing Mentalization 
Mentalization was first explicitly described by French psychoanalysts studying 
psychosomatic phenomena in the 1960s, heavily drawing on Freud’s initial ideas on the 
mental apparatus (Holmes, 2006; Lecours & Bouchard, 1997). Since then, Francophone 
authors have further elaborated this line of thought, while absorbing influences from other 
sources, most importantly Bion’s theory of thinking (see Bouchard & Lecours, 2008; Lecours 
& Bouchard, 1997). In their review, Choi-Kan and Gunderson (2008) synthesize the 
psychoanalytic view of the concept as “understanding and transforming internal experience 
into mentally contained forms” (p. 7). Within this perspective, the term involves something 
becoming mental through some sort of transformation, otherwise being bound to discharge 
outside the mental realm – namely, through somatization and acting-out. In Allen, Fonagy, 
and Bateman’s (2008) words, “to make something mental – or more elaborately mental” (p. 
7, italics in the original) is still the bedrock sense of mentalizing. 
Still, the most popular and vastly explored use of the term, which might be called the 
Anglophone perspective, has a more recent origin in the work of Peter Fonagy and his 
collaborators (e.g., Allen et al., 2008; Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002). Bridging 
concepts and findings from psychoanalysis, attachment theory, developmental psychology, 
psychopathology, philosophy of mind, and neuroscience, they use the terms mentalization, 
mentalizing, and reflective function (RF) rather interchangeably, although such distinctions 
became increasingly relevant as theory refined and expanded. In their definition, 
mentalization is the ability to represent and understand mental states in oneself and others, 
and to interpret actions in terms of intentional mental states (e.g., needs, desires, feelings, 
beliefs, goals, purposes, reasons) (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004). It is a developmental 
achievement based on the consistent experience of having one’s mental state accurately 
mirrored in a marked contingent way (i.e., attuned but modified) by a significant caregiver, 
thus allowing for the development of representations of mental states, or second order 
representations (Fonagy et al., 2002). This metacognitive ability is preceded by two other 
(prementalistic) modes of experiencing psychic reality: psychic equivalence, in which mental 
states are felt as real, with no “as-if” quality (equating reality instead of representing it); and 
pretend mode, when mental states are decoupled from reality as if unrelated to and having no 
implications on it (Fonagy et al. 2002; Fonagy & Target, 1996). 
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That these two perspectives, Francophone and Anglophone – or French-Freudian and 
developmental-intersubjective (Bouchard & Lecours, 2008), or yet psychoanalytic/clinical-
psychodynamic and social cognitive/developmental (Bouchard et al., 2008; Choi-Kan & 
Gunderson, 2008) –, both use the same word seems nearly incidental at first. In fact, what 
becomes mentalized in one case and the other (affects, drives, raw experience vs. self, other, 
actions) is not quite the same. Also, a tendency to focus on intrapsychic processing in the first 
case and in interpersonal interpretation/social cognition in the second appears to exist. 
Additionally, a higher emphasis on preconscious automatic mental functions seems to 
characterize the former where a concern with metacognition and reflection conducted by an 
agentive self takes the main role within the latter. However, authors believe that different 
facets of a core mentalization process are illuminated by each perspective (Bouchard et al., 
2008). 
One possible view would be that mentalization in its broadest sense provides the 
buildings blocks in which the more complex and specific capacity for RF – using 
representation and symbolization to make sense of mental states – relies (Bram & Gabbard, 
2001; Lecours & Bouchard, 1997). Vermote (2005) defies this idea, arguing that some 
patients show great capacity for interpreting others’ behavior while lacking contact with their 
own affects. Others are highly creative in associative psychic functioning and in great contact 
with emotions but at the same time lack ability to interpret their own behavior and that of 
others. Finer conceptual integration may be facilitated by the recent description of 
mentalization as a multidimensional construct within which at least four polarities can be 
described and assessed: automatic (implicit)/controlled (explicit), internally 
focused/externally focused, self-oriented/other-oriented, and cognitive process/affective 
process (Fonagy et al., 2012). Clearly, different dimensions and polarities are privileged 
within different approaches to mentalization. 
Of particular interest, though, are the suggestions coming from the study of Bouchard 
et al. (2008) in which the relationships between three measures of mentalization were 
examined. After rating the same transcripts from Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) protocols 
with three different scales – Reflective Function Scale (RFS), Mental States Rating System 
(MSRS), and “Grille de l’Élaboration Verbale de l’Affect” [Verbal Elaboration of Affect 
Scale] (GEVA) –, exploratory factor analyses revealed three components of mentalization 
composed of combined aspects of the rating systems: the capacity to use high-level affective 
regulatory (defensive) procedures over low-level defensive ones; the capacity to elaborate, 
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transform, and objectify affects into verbally articulate abstract form; and an attitude of 
focusing on mental processes. 
Importantly, these results suggest that high levels of mental elaboration may not imply 
reflectiveness, and instead tend to associate with a rational objectivistic attitude towards 
mental processes. In fact, the formal quality of representations does not inform about their 
present dynamic role (Bouchard et al., 2008) – for instance, high levels of elaboration can be 
used defensively and/or in pretend mode. 
Research on Therapist’s Mentalization 
Very few studies have addressed therapists’ mentalizing processes. In a systematic 
literature review on assessment methods of psychotherapists’ mentalization,3 we ended with 
10 records, to which we added seven more considered relevant coming from prior non-
systematic search. From this set, we were able to identify only 12 different empirical studies 
(reported in 16 references), among which 11 involved therapists as participants and only two 
included patients as well; four of the 17 records concerned the presentation, validation, and/or 
development of measures. As to the measures themselves, most of the records employed 
variants of Lina Normandin and Marc-André Bouchard’s Countertransference Rating System 
(CRS); three studies used the RFS applied to different sources; and one paper proposed a new 
approach to assess therapist’s reflective consciousness based on mentalization and 
experiencing scales. We now present a review of this research. 
 Without initially making explicit use of the concept of mentalization, Normandin and 
her colleagues created the CRS (Lecours, Bouchard, & Normandin, 1995; Normandin & 
Bouchard, 1993), in which they described three types of therapist’s mental (or CT) activities: 
objective-rational (Obr), where a detached observer rather than a participant position is 
adopted, and a concern with generalizability beclouds the uniqueness of the patient’s 
experience; reactive (Reac), representing the classical idea of CT as defensive reactivity 
turning the therapist into an unaware participant; and reflective (Ref), when a therapist-
                                                          
3 The review was conducted according to PRISMA guidelines. Eleven databases were searched in November 
2014. Search terms were: (1) therapist* OR psychotherapist* OR counselor* OR counsellor* OR 
countertransference OR counter-transference (Subject); AND (2) reflective function* OR mentali* OR mental 
state* OR affect* elaboration; NOT (3) mentalist; NOT (4) mentalism. We found 665 results, 504 after removing 
duplicates. Through an intentionally overinclusive screening process, we filtered 101 results, applying exclusion 
criteria only: editorials, reviews, errata, interviews, non-scientific documents, and records that did not link the 
two dimensions were kept out. Elegibility was assessed with more strict criteria (references with explicit 
mention to therapist mentalization and presenting research methods and/or results), resulting in 10 records. 
No restraints were introduced respective to language and type or year of publication. 
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participant contains and elaborates to some extent his or her emotional reaction without 
falling into unrecognized impulsive mental activity. In initial versions of the CRS, only the 
Ref activity was further divided into phases and sub-phases. Later, subtypes were added to the 
Obr and the Reac dimensions as well (Normandin & Ensink, 2007); Bouchard developed the 
MSRS (see above) as a general model of adult mental states that has been applied to CT 
research (e.g., Goldfeld et al., 2008); and the CRS was converted into the Therapist Mental 
Activities Scale to make it fully compatible with Fonagy’s model (Ensink et al., 2013). 
 Research using the CRS across different psychotherapeutic models, rating therapist’s 
written reactions to clinical material, has suggested that, contrary to expectation, novices tend 
to respond with higher proportions of Ref activity, whereas experienced therapists show more 
Reac activity; however, the latter came up with richer Ref activity (Séguin & Bouchard, 1996; 
Lecours et al., 1995; Normandin & Bouchard, 1993). A profile for high-level therapist’s 
reflective functioning was suggested, including the ability to achieve high reflective 
elaboration, to let oneself react (adaptive regression), and to be flexible enough to reexamine 
this reactivity (Normandin & Ensink, 2007; Séguin & Bouchard, 1996). 
 D. Diamond, Stovall-McClough, Clarkin, and Levy (2003) studied therapists’ and 
patients’ attachment state of mind and RF regarding the therapeutic relationship and their 
impact on the process and outcome in Transference-Focused Psychotherapy over the course 
of one year. Results showed that the same therapist may reveal different levels of  RF with 
different patients, a finding for which the authors offered three explanations believed to be at 
work: “(1) The therapist’s RF rating is picking up a countertransference factor that might 
curtail or enhance his or her capacity to mentalize; (2) The therapist’s RF may be modified by 
that of the patient so that it comes to mirror that of the patient, or vice versa; or (3) The RF 
might be coconstructed such that each patient and therapist contributes to the creation of a 
unique interpersonal climate that may allow RF to flourish or wither for both participants.” (p. 
242). In his reanalysis of this study, Goodman (2010) further explored the first explanation 
and found evidence suggesting that “therapists working with traumatized patients, whose 
mental contents might feel overwhelming, summon a highly sophisticated and complex RF to 
protect themselves from feeling so overwhelmed” (pp. 86-87). In sum, in different ways, both 
approaches to this study support our assumption that therapists’ mentalization must be studied 
as a relationship-specific state-like process rather than (or additionally to) a general trait-like 
capacity, and they suggest that it is a relevant dimension in dealing with CT phenomena. 
 This conclusion appears to be supported by a more recent study from Rizq and Target 
(2010). Findings indicated that higher RF in counseling psychologists could be associated 
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with the ability to manage feelings evoked by difficult and challenging patients, and lower 
levels of RF were accompanied by accounts of distancing or becoming overwhelmed by 
strong feelings and patient’s in-session behavior. However, exceptions were found. 
Specifically, one of the 12 participants’ high RF appeared to fuel clinically detrimental 
anxious and depressive ruminations. Thus, a useful model of ECE should allow discriminating 
productive mentalization of CT from ruminative self-consciousness – which, according to 
Campbell et al. (1996), is involuntary, emotionally negative, and motivated by anxiety, in 
contrast to reflection, which is voluntary, emotionally positive, and guided by curiosity. 
 Measuring therapists’ RF through semi-structured interviews about specific patients, a 
recent study (Reading, 2013) assessed the relationship between the mentalizing capacity of 43 
therapists’ conducting Brief Relational Therapy and a number of process and outcome 
variables. Results suggest that therapists’ RF can predict relevant process dimensions (namely 
with regard to addressing and resolving alliance ruptures) and therapeutic results reported at 
6-month follow-ups. Hence, therapists’ mentalization appears to facilitate relational work, 
which in turn may be an important mediator of long-term therapeutic gains. 
 Lamboy, Blanchet, and Lecomte (2004) validated linguistic indicators of therapists’ 
reflective consciousness based on descriptions of reflectivity extracted from CRS, GEVA, and 
the Experiencing Scale manuals (EXP; Klein, Mathieu-Coughlan, & Kiesler, 1986 – see 
below). The authors intended to reduce inference and increase objectivity and inter-rater 
fidelity, which they demonstrated to be problematic in the measures reviewed, with the final 
goal of creating the “Grille d’Analyse de la Conscience Reflexive du Thérapeute” [Therapist 
Reflective Consciousness Rating System]. To our knowledge, the task was left unfinished so 
far, but the motivations and preliminary findings of this study are important to the field, 
showing that linguistic markers can be an alternative and/or add objectivity to rating systems 
in assessing reflectivity. 
 Although lacking explicit reference to mentalization, and thus uncaptured in our 
systematic review (see footnote 3), a few other lines of research may be relevant to our scope. 
In particular, research addressing therapists’ mental activity as referential process (Bucci, 
2002) and experiencing (Klein et. al, 1986) has an arguable connection with mentalization. 
Bucci’s (2002) Multiple Code Theory draws on the psychoanalytical notion of 
multiple systems of thought and proposes a new metapsychology based on both cognitive 
science and psychoanalytic ideas on emotional information processing. Specifically, three 
systems of processing and representing information are described (nonverbal subsymbolic, 
nonverbal symbolic, and verbal symbolic), each with its own operating principles. These 
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systems are connected, partially and to varying degrees, by the referential process – a 
bidirectional process by which emotional and bodily experience, largely subsymbolic, is 
linked to imagery and then to language, and the words of others are connected to one’s own 
emotional and bodily systems (Bucci, Maskit, & Hoffman, 2012). Based on the debate, held 
by the authors, comparing the referential process with Lecours and Bouchard’s model of 
mentalization (Bouchard & Lecours, 1998; Bucci, 1999; Lecours & Bouchard, 1999), we 
believe there are significant points of contact between the two, despite a greater emphasis on 
integration achieved through the former while transformation is central in the latter. 
 Recent studies assessed components of the referential process in session transcripts 
and therapists’ case notes through computerized linguistic measures of referential activity 
(RA) and reflection (REF) (Bucci & Maskit, 2007; Bucci et al., 2012; Hoffman, Algus, 
Braun, Bucci, & Maskit, 2013). RA, considered pivotal in the referential process 
(narrative/symbolizing phase, following the arousal phase), can be considered a measure of 
engagement in experience, the degree to which language processes emotional experience. In 
the opposite direction, representing the reorganizing/working through phase of the referential 
process, REF means regulation or distancing from emotional experience. In the first of these 
studies, assessing session transcripts of a psychoanalytic treatment, high levels of RA in the 
analyst’s speech were significantly correlated with session effectiveness as rated by 
independent judges (Bucci & Maskit, 2007). In the second one, involving case notes from 
successful and unsuccessful psychoanalytical processes, high positive correlations were found 
between measures of therapists’ RA and therapeutic effectiveness assessed by independent 
judges based on initial and final treatment notes (Bucci et al., 2012). REF yielded a 
nonsignificant mild negative correlation with the same measure of change. The fact that REF 
and RA clearly vary in opposite directions suggests that the term “reflection” within this 
model is employed somehow differently from the common use in mentalization research (see 
last paragraph from the previous section). REF’s emphasis on logic functions and distancing 
from experience may lie closer to MSRS’s objective-rational and high-level defensive mental 
activity. Its use by therapists may also be part of the type of regulatory mechanism activated 
with more challenging patients that Goodman (2010) highlighted (see above). 
 The dimension of experiencing was mostly conceptualized in the work of Eugene 
Gendlin and Carl Rogers as “the process of attending to that unverbalized yet ongoing 
visceral flow and using it as a referent against which one can check tentative symbolizations, 
thereby discovering the meanings and significance of what one is feeling” (Pascual-Leone & 
Greenberg, 2006, p. 33). EXP (Klein et al., 1986), its operationalization for research, rates the 
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quality of an individual's experiencing of himself through seven levels as revealed in verbal 
communications, ranging from impersonal, superficial, or abstract-intellectual content at low 
levels, to more advanced stages where feelings are purposefully explored and emergent levels 
of experiencing serve as referents for problem resolution and understanding (Klein et al., 
1986). It has been suggested that the experiencing construct may fill a gap in mentalization 
literature regarding implicit self-oriented mentalization of affect (Liljenfors & Lundh, 2015). 
Although research on therapists’ experiencing is very scarce, one of the two studies we found 
(Kazariants, 2011) supports the relevance of the matter, suggesting that it benefits the 
resolution of alliance ruptures. The other one demonstrated that “experientally grounded 
reflection”, measured with EXP, can be positively impacted by training (Safran et al., 2014). 
 In conclusion, several previous models pertain to the field of ECE. However, by 
proposing a new model we intend to, simultaneously: extend the scope of CT management 
research, namely through a preferential focus on elaboration; narrow the scope of previous 
mentalization models by limiting the object of study to self-oriented psychotherapist 
mentalizing processes (i.e., by sticking to the field of CT phenomena); and widen the range of 
psychological processes contemplated under the notion of elaboration, by absorbing 
influences from other models describing the mental processing of experience. 
Mentalizing countertransference experience: A model for research 
Based on the reported literature, thus, we are interested in designing a model for ECE 
that accounts for increasing levels of elaboration without losing sight of the quality of 
experiential engagement. We believe two primary dimensions are needed to this end, 
separating non-defensive immersion in and awareness of experience from reflection. Others 
found value in similar distinctions, from supporters of the aforementioned two-step model to 
authors defining self-reflexivity as a “dialectical process of experiencing oneself as a subject 
as well as of reflecting on oneself as an object” (Aron, 2000, p. 668), integrating objective and 
subjective self-awareness; or even those suggesting a “kind of bidimensionality” in EXP, 
where stages 1 to 3 represent progressive ownership of affective reactions; stage 4 is the 
turning point, characterized by an account of fully owned experiences from an inward 
attention focus; and stages 5 to 7 involve increasing self-exploration, questioning, and 
awareness of emergent feelings and internal processes (Greenberg & Safran, 1987; Klein et 
al., 1986). Descriptions of CT internal processing in terms of phases also identify a turning 
point from evenly-hovering attention to active search for meaning, from containment to 
observation and questioning (Tansey & Burke, 1989). In mentalization terms, these 
dimensions may be regarded as implicit versus explicit poles. 
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In addition, and in line with the importance of linguistic features mentioned above 
(Lamboy et al., 2004), we believe narrative research may also provide us with useful clues as 
to how psychological work can be traced in therapists’ discourse, considering that narrative 
organization may reveal implicit information-processing, defensive, and affect-regulatory 
mechanisms employed in the topic being addressed (e.g., Daniel, 2009). For instance, 
Habermas (2006; Habermas & Diel, 2010) distinguished between elaborated, dramatic, and 
impersonal narrative types. Differences among these types may signal varying levels of 
defense mechanisms, and are indicated by linguistic features such as the number of 
perspectives included/excluded, focus on present-narrator/past-protagonist perspectives, or 
subjectivity markers (e.g., mental expressions, presence of grammatical subject). 
 We propose, then, a bidimensional model to study ECE as a mentalization process 
varying in Experiencing and Reflective Elaboration. Contrary to some of the examples just 
cited, our dimensions are not cumulative, but virtually independent instead. Complementing 
these primary dimensions, our model assesses five other facets of ECE, inspired by the 
literature reviewed above and narrative and language research. These additional dimensions 
can be separately investigated and rated, and are described in detail in Table 1.
4
 Besides 
clarifying ECE in greater depth, our seven dimensions may be articulated in a continuous 
score, which is useful for research purposes. In practice, ECE is to be assessed in therapists’ 
comments on particular sessions and/or patients. 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------- 
Concerning our primary dimensions, Experiencing expresses increasing ownership 
and containment of immediate experience. Its levels (Table 1) resonate with important aspects 
of stages 1 to 4 from the EXP, the first four levels of the affect tolerance dimension from 
GEVA (see Lecours & Bouchard, 1997), and several features from CRS and MSRS (see 
above). In level 0, parts of what is being experienced are warded off, avoided, or dissociated, 
the result being that an observer has no experiential access to it. On the contrary, in level 2 
reactions emerge that can be spotted by an observer although they are insufficiently integrated 
                                                          
4
 Aside from the existing literature, our five complementary dimensions of ECE reflect our effort to refine the 
capacity of the model to differentiate levels of elaboration when applied to material of varying elaborative 
quality. Also, we reckoned that adding these dimensions would be useful to further characterize 
countertransference positions (Figure 1) and thus help future raters, while providing several ordinal scores to 
be tested separately or in articulation. Future research should examine whether the latent structure of these 
seven dimensions confirms our hypothesized organization of ECE in two primary dimensions. 
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by the therapist him/herself. Although “reactivity” is overt at this level, we believe both levels 
0 and 2 can substantiate CT reactions, to the extent that they deviate from a therapist’s 
normal/baseline CT experience. Only in level 4 a full acceptance of experience takes place. 
Although transformation in the mental quality of experience occurs through preconscious 
spontaneous psychic work at these levels, they entail progressive CT elaboration. Thus, we 
view experiencing as a dimension of automatic/implicit mentalization (Fonagy et al., 2012) of 
CT experience (although, at level 4, controlled/explicit processes begin to operate). 
Reflective Elaboration represents an actual effort to explain, organize, or make sense 
of things, pertaining to controlled/explicit elaboration, and can be simplified in two main 
levels (Table 1): Level 0, a rather passive account of information, be it a fact, an idea, or a 
subjective experience, in which the conscious/explicit goal of the speaker is to convey a 
communicative content already present in his or her mind; and level 2, an active attempt to 
generate questions, explanations, signification, or understanding – more than a recipient or a 
vehicle, the subject takes the position of an author. 
As stated before, our primary dimensions are independent, meaning that, for example, 
high levels of reflective elaboration can operate with varying degrees of experiential basis. 
The result is a model in which six CT positions can be described, as presented in Figure 1. 
----------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------- 
The concept of CT position employed is borrowed from Racker’s (1968) distinction 
between CT thoughts and positions, where the former can be seen as mental contents and the 
latter imply greater ego involvement, in what may be considered mental attitudes. Clearly, our 
model describes what therapists do with CT experience regardless of its contents, thus making 
it a model of CT positions. We now describe each position in greater detail. 
Factual-concrete position (detached description). When asked to comment on a 
session, the therapist provides impersonal objectivistic descriptions of events, actions, or 
concrete personal characteristics. There is a sense of absent subject, as if it would be 
indifferent who the speaker is, and little can be known about his or her experience of the 
session. The therapist is more concerned with reporting than explaining or understanding – 
the emphasis is on description. An example might be: She was about 30. She was silent for a 
while, and I told her we had 50 minutes to talk about anything she wanted. 
Abstract-rational position (detached meaning-making). Here, we also find an 
impersonal objectivistic comment, but this time the observations are made in terms of general 
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categories, with the main emphasis on explanation and classification. This may include 
theoretical jargon, description of personal or relational patterns, diagnostic hypothesizing, but 
always in a rather rational and affectively distant fashion. References to the therapist 
experience are eventually made, but as if observed from the outside, lacking specificity, and 
presented as part of a conceptual frame rather than a personal one. The defensive use of 
theory mentioned above can be present, in which case intellectualization is the specific 
defense employed. Example: He is a narcissistic man. Narcissists tend to be leaders, because 
of their need to be the center of others’ attention. Still, they often become annoying for other 
people, including therapists. 
Projective-impulsive position (disruptive expression). These are the cases when the 
therapist expresses poorly modulated emotions – the emotion having the person rather than 
the person having the emotion (Angus & Greenberg, 2011). The main emphasis is on 
discharge or catharsis, since the purpose appears to be to expel or get rid of an untolerated 
experience rather than exploring it. A blind engagement or unrecognized reactivity is present: 
The internal determinants of what is being experienced are unattended, and instead its 
object/target is implicitly or explicitly recognized as direct and sufficient cause. Examples: 
He’s just so boring! No wonder her wife left him…; or How could I be so stupid? 
Argumentative position (disruptive meaning-making). Also here, the therapist is 
blindly engaged in some kind of unrecognized reaction, but now there is an emphasis on 
justification and self-legitimization, mechanisms through which he seems to be struggling 
with some aspect of experience – e.g., guilt. Once more, defensive uses of theory may fall on 
this CT position, but this time rationalization will be the central defense. Self-legitimization 
can be either achieved through justification or judgmental appreciations (including self-
blaming). Ruminative self-consciousness (see above), driven by whatever type of anxiety, can 
also be included here. In fact, the main feature in this position is the presence of an undesired 
experience with which the therapist is trying to deal while failing to accept it in himself. An 
example for this position might be: Just because he’s new in town and felt lonely for a couple 
of weekends, doesn’t mean he needs a therapist. You shouldn´t go to therapy looking for a 
friend. 
Contemplative-mindful position (contained description/expression). When speaking 
from this position, therapists will provide an account of emerging thoughts, perceptions, 
sensations, or emotions from an experiential standpoint. Contents expressed are owned as 
subjective production, implying that the emphasis is on disclosure and the therapist reveals 
acceptance of, and attention to, different nuances within the experiential field. This kind of 
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CT position can be easily associated with mindfulness, with its qualities of nonjudgmental 
and nonreactive awareness of moment-to-moment experience (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). It also 
intersects with descriptions of congruence (Rogers, 1957), therapeutic presence (Geller et al., 
2010), or the type of evenly-hovering attention and openness to internal experience 
recommended by psychoanalytic authors (Bion, 1970; Freud, 1912/1958; Ogden, 2005). We 
believe this CT position may have a very relevant clinical impact in itself, as it entails an 
ability to experience, tolerate, and “survive” feelings evoked in the therapist by the patient’s 
intense emotions – Bion’s (1962) containing function –, establishing a form of affective 
communication through which the latter learns to tolerate and regulate his or her affective 
experience (Safran & Muran, 2000). Also because this aware, nonreactive taking-in of the 
patients’ emotional life will be decisive for the unhooking from cognitive-interpersonal cycles 
mentioned earlier in this paper – in our view, Safran and Muran’s (2000) metacommunication, 
described by the authors as “a type of mindfulness in action” (p. 108) and key strategy to 
repair alliance ruptures and resolve therapeutic impasses, relies on this CT postition. An 
example: At a point I realized I wasn’t paying attention. I could sense her feeling of a huge 
burden, but my mind just wandered away, while a kind of boredom started to grow inside me. 
Mentalizing position (contained meaning-making). From this CT position, the 
therapist tries to reflect and make sense of his or her experience while engaged in and fully 
recognizing it as his or her own. The emphasis, now, is in understanding, and an investigatory 
attitude prevails. The dialectic movement between experiencing, reflecting, and transforming 
shares important features with processes of mentalized affectivity (Jurist, 2005) and advanced 
experiencing and emotional processing (Klein et al., 1986; Pascual-Leone & Greenberg, 
2007). The main difference between this position and the previous is in part pointed by Choi-
Kain and Gunderson (2008) when comparing mindfulness with mentalization: The 
contemplative-mindful position concerns acceptance of internal experience, whereas 
mentalizing emphasizes the construction of representation and meaning related to these 
experiences. So, now we find a therapist tentatively exploring his or her CT experience, 
tolerant to frustration and uncertainty (i.e., cognizant of the opaqueness of mental states), and 
hopefully achieving new understanding and new experiences regarding what is going on in 
therapy. The kind of insight coming from this process, no matter how experience-near 
(Pascual-Leone & Greenberg, 2006), is certainly experience-grounded and has a quality of 
emerging knowledge, which is compatible with using theory as a resource in the process of 
signification. The fact that clinical understanding is informed by sufficiently mentalized CT 
experience makes it necessarily rooted in and contingent of the intersubjective field created by 
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the particular dyad, and this is, to our understanding, the key ingredient of unsaturated (Bion, 
1963), lively, clinically relevant knowledge and understanding. Example: I don’t usually get 
this feeling in the end of our sessions. It feels like I’ve done most of the talking, like when 
you’re with a stranger in an elevator. I’m wondering why she would feel like a stranger to 
me, why now. 
Concluding remarks 
We presented our operationalization of ECE as a model of CT positions and 
dimensions reflecting the quality of therapists’ mentalization. Mostly, we are interested in 
investigating whether variations in ECE can be associated with other process and outcome 
dimensions of psychotherapy from any approach. In fact, we think ECE may play an 
important role in facilitating a number of studied common factors of psychotherapy such as 
alliance, empathy, positive regard, congruence, repairing alliance ruptures, and CT 
management (cf. Norcross, 2011). We also believe it is pivotal in rendering experiential and 
relational dimensions of therapy as less incidental and more available for patient-customized 
judicious clinical use as possible. 
Conceptualizing ECE as therapist mentalization facilitates a balance among historical 
tensions regarding CT: within the classical position, CT is decoupled from the patient’s reality 
and treated as if unrelated to it, echoing the pretend mode; but reservations sometimes 
expressed towards Heimann’s totalistic position (cf. Gabbard, 2001) may be synthesized as 
warnings against the risk of managing CT in psychic equivalence, where disowned personal 
reactivity is either unrecognized (projected) or felt as a direct expression of external reality 
(the patient’s difficulties). We subscribe to the view that mentalizing CT experience means 
recognizing it as related to the clinical reality and yet being able to “play” with it (Fonagy et 
al. 2002; Fonagy & Target, 1996). 
It should be clear, though, that our model does not concern but a few dimensions 
within the broad field of mentalization. In particular, regarding the four polarities 
aforementioned (Fonagy et al., 2012), we believe ECE is a model of mentalization equally 
involving automatic and controlled processes (e.g., experiencing and reflecting), with an 
internal focus (feelings, thoughts, imagery, somatic experiences…) somewhat prevailing over 
the external focus (e.g., therapist’s reactions and actual behaviors), mostly about self (vs. 
others), and balancing cognitive and affective processes. Also, ECE is quite specific in 
pertaining to CT experience, rendering dispensable for our model a range of mentalization 
deficits unlikely to be found in psychotherapists’ work (e.g., autistic states, paranoid 
delusions, severe loss of impulse control), and leaving other-oriented mentalization on a 
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secondary level of importance. We wish to make a brief point about the implications of this 
selective focus. 
Clearly, we wouldn’t suggest that mentalizing about patients and the therapeutic 
exchange in itself is any less important than ECE, or even that such processes are clearly 
separable since the latter is grounded in relational experience. We think ECE is an important 
ingredient of effective psychotherapy, impacting both relational and technical dimensions of 
the therapeutic process, but we assume it is one among others. More importantly, though, our 
model prioritizes the assessment of self-oriented aspects of mentalization over patient-
oriented mentalization. In our view, the distinction between self- and other-focus is clear at 
the explicit level of mentalization, and an explicit focus on self is rated higher in our model 
compared to an explicit focus on patient’s experiences (e.g., internal focus dimension – see 
Table 1). At the implicit level, though, the distinction between self- and other-focus seems 
less straightforward, which may be the cause for the gap in mentalization literature mentioned 
previously (Liljenfors & Lundh, 2015). Still, we believe that the predominance of subjective 
experiential embeddedness (i.e., the extent to which inner felt referents are used) may account 
for the self-orientation at the implicit affective level. In turn, self-focused implicit 
mentalization of cognition may be indicated by signs of post-formal reasoning (e.g., treating 
one’s own thoughts as relative, dialectical, contextual, and subjective; see Marchand, 2002). 
In the words of Allen (2006), implicit self-mentalizing entails “a sense of self as an 
emotionally engaged agent – ‘what it feels like to be me’ in the process of thinking, feeling, 
and acting” (p. 11). Our model privileges self-oriented mentalization in the sense that its 
dimensions tend to value markers of implicit and explicit self-oriented mentalizing over 
mentalization of patients’ actions and experiences. 
And yet, we believe that ECE (in particular, therapist’s implicit self-oriented 
mentalization) is actually a necessary part of clinically useful other (patient)-oriented 
mentalizing. For instance, highly accurate observations about patients’ experiences can be 
irrelevant or even detrimental if stated from a poorly mentalized CT position – e.g., failing to 
convey the therapist’s containment of his or her own emotions or a full awareness of the 
subjective and relative nature of his or her own impressions. In other words, we believe 
important mentalizing principles in psychotherapy, such as the inquisitive stance, not-
knowing, or the respect for the opaqueness of mental states (Fonagy et al., 2012), rely 
primarily on the therapist’s attitude towards his or her own mental processes and subjective 
states, i.e., on CT positions. In this regard, a recent study found a strong positive association 
between therapists’ “professional self-doubt” and patients’ improvement in interpersonal 
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problems, and a negative effect of therapists’ self-assessed “advanced relational skills” on 
patients’ global functioning and interpersonal problems (Nissen-Lie, Monsen, Ulleber, & 
Rønnestad, 2013). In the light of our model, these results might mean diversely mentalized 
CT positions. 
As may have become evident, our major assumptions about the therapist’s work are 
indebted to the work of others, namely Bion’s model of container-contained, alpha-function, 
reverie, and theory of thinking (Bion, 1962, 1963; Ogden, 2005), Winnicott’s concepts of 
potential space and transitional phenomena (Winnicott, 1971; Bram & Gabbard, 2001), 
Kernberg’s (1997) defense of  a “third position” created by the analyst’s reflective stance 
aside from the engagement in the transference-CT dynamics, Fonagy and colleagues’ 
descriptions of the mentalizing stance (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004), Rogers’ delineation of the 
conditions for change (Rogers, 1957), and Safran and Muran’s views on the “beginner’s 
mind” and the use of metacommunication (Safran & Muran, 2000). Regardless of its roots, 
though, we believe our model addresses ubiquitous phenomena in psychotherapy. 
The main limitations of our approach concern, first and foremost, the impossibility of 
a direct apprehension of CT phenomena – we will be inferring from derivatives of our object 
of study. Second, speech as the source of information about CT has its shortcomings. As 
much as we put all our efforts in refining a rating system, important unconscious and 
phenomenological dimensions will remain inaccessible – counteridentifications, imagery, 
visceral responses, to name a few examples. Third, the focus on CT positions doesn’t 
guarantee a sufficient account of other constituents of the CT construct (Hayes, 2004) – e.g., 
origins, triggers, effects –, neither does it address larger experiential patterns, or transference-
countertransference configurations, unfolding as the process evolves over time. 
Still, we hope our model adds to the effort of investigating and drawing attention to 
the importance of psychotherapists’ purposeful use of subjectivity and consideration of the 
experiences emerging within each unique dyad. In times of treatment manualization, such 
delicate work may require no less protection than an endangered species.  
MENTALIZING COUNTERTRANSFERENCE  22 
 
References 
Allen, J. G. (2006). Mentalizing in practice. In J.G. Allen & P. Fonagy (Eds.), Handbook of 
mentalization-based treatment (pp. 3-30). Chichester: Wiley. 
Allen, J. G., Fonagy, P., & Bateman, A. W. (2008). Mentalizing in clinical practice. 
Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing. 
Angus, L., & Greenberg, L. (2011). Working with narrative in emotion-focused therapy: 
Changing stories, healing lives. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Aron, L. (2000). Self-reflexivity and the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic 
Psychology, 17, 667–689. doi: 10.1037/0736-9735.17.4.667 
Bateman, A. W., & Fonagy, P. (2004). Psychotherapy for borderline personality disorder: 
Mentalization-based treatment. New York; Oxford University Press. 
Bernier, A., & Dozier, M. (2002). The client-counselor match and the corrective emotional 
experience: Evidence from interpersonal and attachment research. Psychotherapy, 39, 
32–43. doi: 10.1037//0033-3204.39.1.32 
Bion, W. R. (1962). Learning from experience. London: Karnac Books. 
Bion, W. R. (1963). Elements of psycho-analysis. London: William Heinemann Medical 
Books Ltd. 
Bion, W. R. (1970). Attention and interpretation. London: Tavistock. 
Bouchard, M.-A., & Lecours, S. (1998). Some comments on Bucci's Multiple Code 
Psychoanalytic Psychology. Canadian Journal of Psychoanalysis, 6, 261-270. 
Bouchard, M.-A. & Lecours, S. (2008). Contemporary approaches to mentalization in the 
light of Freud’s Project. In F. N. Busch (Ed.), Mentalization: Theoretical considerations, 
research findings, and clinical implications (pp. 103–129). New York: The Analytic 
Press. 
Bouchard, M.-A., Target, M., Lecours, S., Fonagy, P., Tremblay, L.-M., Schachter, A., & 
Stein, H. (2008). Mentalization in adult attachment narratives: Reflective functioning, 
mental states, and affect elaboration compared. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 25, 47–66. 
doi: 10.1037/0736-9735.25.1.47 
Bram, A. D., & Gabbard, G. O. (2001). Potential space and reflective functioning: Towards 
conceptual clarification and preliminary clinical implications. International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, 82, 685-699. doi: 10.1516/5ce7-qdtr-e4d5-gqgk 
Bucci, W. (1999). Response to the comments of Bouchard and Lecours. Canadian Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, 7, 23-29. 
MENTALIZING COUNTERTRANSFERENCE  23 
 
Bucci, W., & Maskit, B. (2007). Beneath the surface of the therapeutic interaction: The 
psychoanalytic method in modern dress. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic 
Association, 55, 1355–1397. doi: 10.1177/000306510705500412 
Bucci, W., Maskit, B., & Hoffman, L. (2012). Objective measures of subjective experience: 
The use of therapist notes in process-outcome research. Psychodynamic Psychiatry, 40, 
303–340. doi: 10.1521/pdps.2012.40.2.303 
Campbell, J. D., Trapnell, P. D., Heine, S. J., Katz, I. M., Lavallee, L. F., & Lehman, D. R. 
(1996). Self-concept clarity: Measurement, personality correlates, and cultural 
boundaries. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 141–156. doi: 
10.1037//0022-3514.70.1.141   
Choi-Kain, L. W., & Gunderson, J. G. (2008). Mentalization: Ontogeny, assessment and 
application in the treatment of borderline personality disorder. American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 165, 1127-1135. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.2008.07081360 
Daniel, S. I. F. (2009). The developmental roots of narrative expression in therapy: 
Contributions from attachment theory and research. Psychotherapy, 46, 301–316. doi: 
10.1037/a0016082 
Diamond, D., Stovall-McClough, C., Clarkin, J. F., & Levy, K. N. (2003). Patient-therapist 
attachment in the treatment of borderline personality disorder. Bulletin of the Menninger 
Clinic, 67, 227–259. doi: 10.1521/bumc.67.3.227.23433 
Diamond, M. J. (2014). Analytic mind use and interpsychic communication: Driving force in 
analytic technique, pathway to unconscious mental life. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 83, 
525-563. doi: 10.1002/j.2167-4086.2014.00106.x 
Ensink, K., Maheux, J., Normandin, L., Sabourin, S., Diguer, L., Berthelot, N., & Parent, K. 
(2013). The impact of mentalization training on the reflective function of novice 
therapists: A randomized controlled trial. Psychotherapy Research, 23, 526-538. doi: 
10.1080/10503307.2013.800950 
Fonagy, P., Bateman, A. W., & Luyten, P. (2012). Introduction and overview. In A. W. 
Bateman & P. Fonagy (Eds.), Handbook of mentalizing in mental health practice (pp. 3-
42). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press. 
Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., Jurist, E. & Target, M. (2002). Affect regulation, mentalization and 
the development of the self. New York: Other Press. 
Fonagy, P., & Target, M. (1996). Playing with reality: I. Theory of mind and the normal 
development of psychic reality. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 77, 217-233. 
MENTALIZING COUNTERTRANSFERENCE  24 
 
Freud, S. (1912/1958). Recommendations for physicians on the psycho-analytic method of 
treatment. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The standard edition of the complete 
psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 12, pp. 111–120). London: The Hogarth 
Press. 
Freud, S. (1914/1958). Remembering, repeating, and working-through (further 
recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis II). In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), 
The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 12, pp. 
145–156). London: The Hogarth Press. 
Friedman, S. M., & Gelso, C. J. (2000). The development of the Inventory of 
Countertransference Behavior. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 56, 1221–1235. doi: 
10.1002/1097-4679(200009)56:9<1221::aid-jclp8>3.0.co;2-w 
Gabbard, G. O. (2001). A contemporary psychoanalytic model of countertransference. 
Journal of Clinical Psychology, 57 , 983–991. doi: 10.1002/jclp.1065 
Geller, S. M., Greenberg, L. S., & Watson, J. C. (2010). Therapist and client perceptions of 
therapeutic presence: The development of a measure. Psychotherapy Research, 20, 599–
610. doi: 10.1080/10503307.2010.495957 
Gelso, C. J., Fassinger, R. E., Gomez, M.  J.,& Latts, M. G. (1995). Countertransference 
reactions to lesbian clients: The role of homophobia, counselor gender, and 
countertransference management. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 42, 356–364. doi: 
10.1037/0022-0167.42.3.356 
Gelso, C. J., & Hayes, J. A. (2007). Countertransference and the inner world of the 
psychotherapist: Perils and possibilities. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Goldfeld, P., Terra, L., Abuchaim, C., Sordi, A., Wiethaeuper, D., Bouchard, M.-A., . . . 
Ceitlin, L. H. (2008). Mental states as part of countertransference responses in 
psychotherapists facing reports of traumatic events of mourning and sexual violence. 
Psychotherapy  Research, 18, 523–34. doi: 10.1080/10503300801968640 
Goodman, G. (2010). Therapeutic attachment relationships: Interaction structures and the 
processes of therapeutic change. Lanham, MD: Jason Aronson. 
Greenberg, L. S., & Safran, J. D. (1987). Emotion in psychotherapy. New York: Guilford 
Press. 
Grinberg, L. (2001). Teoria da identificação [The theory of identification]. Lisboa: Climepsi. 
Habermas, T. (2006). Who speaks? Who looks? Who feels? Point of view in autobiographical 
narratives. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 87, 497-518. doi: 10.1516/axwm-
qrnf-h69k-9k3c 
MENTALIZING COUNTERTRANSFERENCE  25 
 
Habermas, T., & Diel, V. (2010). The emotional impact of loss narratives: Event severity and 
narrative perspectives. Emotion, 10, 312-323. doi: 10.1037/a0018001 
Hayes, J. A. (2004). The inner world of the psychotherapist: A program of research on 
countertransference. Psychotherapy Research, 14, 21–36. doi: 10.1093/ptr/kph002 
Hayes, J. A., Gelso, C. J., & Hummel, A. M. (2011). Managing countertransference. 
Psychotherapy, 48, 88–97. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737208.003.0012 
Hayes, J. A., Gelso, C. J., VanWagoner, S., & Diemer, R. (1991). Managing 
countertransference: What the experts think. Psychological Reports, 69, 139-148. doi: 
10.2466/pr0.69.5.139-148 
Hoffman, L., Algus, J., Braun, W., Bucci, W., & Maskit, B. (2013). Treatment notes: 
Objective measures of language style point to clinical insights. Journal of the American 
Psychoanalytic Association, 61, 535–568. doi: 10.1177/0003065113489026 
Holmes, J. (2006). Mentalizing from a psychoanalytic perspective. In J.G. Allen & P. Fonagy 
(Eds.), Handbook of mentalization-based treatment (pp. 31-49). Chichester: Wiley. 
Jurist, E. L. (2005). Mentalized affectivity. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 22, 426–444. doi: 
10.1037/0736-9735.22.3.426 
Kabat-Zinn, J. (2003). Mindfulness-based interventions in context: Past, present, and future. 
Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 10, 144-156. doi: 10.1093/clipsy/bpg016 
Kazariants, G. (2011). The relationship between therapist capacity for experientially 
grounded reflection on the therapeutic relationship and alliance rupture resolution 
(Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. 
(UMI No. 3495827). 
Kernberg, O. F. (1997). The nature of interpretation: Intersubjectivity and the third position. 
American Journal of Psychoanalysis, 57, 297-312. 
Kiesler, D. J. (2001). Therapist countertransference: In search of common themes and 
empirical referents. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 57, 1053–1063. doi: 
10.1002/jclp.1073 
Klein, M. H., Mathieu-Coughlan, P., & Kiesler, D. (1986). The Experiencing Scales. In L. S. 
Greenberg, & W. Pinsof (Eds.), The psychotherapeutic process: A research handbook 
(pp. 21-71). New York: Guilford. 
Lamboy, B., Blanchet, A., & Lecomte, C. (2004). L’opérationnalisation du concept de 
conscience reflexive du psychothérapeute [Operationalisation of the concept of therapist 
reflexive consciousness]. Revue Européenne de Psychologie Appliquée, 54, 189–205. 
doi: 10.1016/j.erap.2004.04.001 
MENTALIZING COUNTERTRANSFERENCE  26 
 
Laplanche, J., & Pontalis, J.-B. (2009). Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse [The language of 
psychoanalysis]. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
Latts, M. G., & Gelso, C. J. (1995). Countertransference behavior and management with 
survivors of sexual assault. Psychotherapy, 32, 405–415. doi: 10.1037/0033-
3204.32.3.405 
Lecours, S., & Bouchard, M.-A. (1997). Dimensions of mentalisation: Outlining levels of 
psychic transformation. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 78, 855–875. 
Lecours, S., & Bouchard, M.-A. (1999). Further comments on Bucci's paper and response. 
Canadian Journal of Psychoanalysis, 7, 297-301. 
Lecours, S., Bouchard, M.-A., & Normandin, L. (1995). Countertransference as the therapist's 
mental activity: Experience and gender differences among psychoanalytically oriented 
psychologists. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 12, 259-279. doi: 10.1037/h0079634 
Levine, H. B. (1997). The capacity for countertransference. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 17, 44-
68. doi: 10.1080/07351699709534109 
Levine, H. B. (2012). The colourless canvas: Representation, therapeutic action and the 
creation of mind. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 93, 363–385. doi: 
10.1111/j.1745-8315.2012.00574.x 
Ligiéro, D. P., & Gelso, C. (2002). Countertransference, attachment, and the working 
alliance: The therapists' contribution. Psychotherapy, 39, 3-11. doi: 10.1037/0033-
3204.39.1.3 
Liljenfors, R., & Lundh, L.-G. (2015). Mentalization and intersubjectivity towards a 
theoretical integration. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 32, 36-60. doi: 10.1037/a0037129 
Marchand, H. (2002). Some reflections on postformal stage. Behavioral Development 
Bulletin, 11, 39-46. doi: 10.1037/h0100490 
McDougall, J. (1985). Theaters of the mind: Illusion and truth on the psychoanalytic stage. 
New York: Basic Books. 
McGinn, L. K. & Sanderson, W. C. (2001). What allows cognitive behavior therapy to be 
brief: Overview, efficacy, and crucial factors facilitating brief treatment. Clinical 
Psychology: Science and Practice, 8, 23-27. doi: 10.1093/clipsy.8.1.23 
Morgan, A. C., Bruschweiler-Stern, N., Harrison, A. M., Lyons-Ruth, K., Nahum, J. P., 
Sander, L., Stern, D. N., et al. (1998). Moving along to things left undone. Infant Mental 
Health Journal, 19, 324–332. doi: 10.1002/(sici)1097-0355(199823)19:3<324::aid-
imhj9>3.3.co;2-c 
MENTALIZING COUNTERTRANSFERENCE  27 
 
Nissen-Lie, H. A., Monsen, J. T., Ulleberg, P., & Rønnestad, M. H. (2013). Psychotherapists’ 
self-reports of their interpersonal functioning and difficulties in practice as predictors of 
patient outcome. Psychotherapy Research, 23, 86–104. doi: 
10.1080/10503307.2012.735775 
Norcross, J. C. (Ed.) (2011). Psychotherapy relationships that work: Evidence-based 
responsiveness (2
nd
 ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Normandin, L. & Bouchard, M.-A. (1993). The effects of theoretical orientation and 
experience on rational, reactive and reflective countertransference. Psychotherapy 
Research, 3, 77-94. doi: 10.1080/10503309312331333689 
Normandin, L., & Ensink, K. (2007). La GAC: Grille d’analyse du contre-transfert dans le 
traitement des troubles graves de la personnalité [The Countertransference Rating System 
(CRS): A tool to analyse countertransference in the treatment of severe personality 
disorders]. Santé Mentale au Québec, 32, 57–74. doi: 10.7202/016509ar 
Ogden, T. H. (2005). This art of psychoanalysis: Dreaming undreamt dreams and interrupted 
cries. London: Routledge. 
Pascual-Leone, A., & Greenberg, L. S. (2006). Insight and awareness in experiential therapy. 
In L. G. Castonguay & C. E. Hill (Eds.), Insight in psychotherapy (pp. 31-56). 
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Pascual-Leone, A., & Greenberg, L. S. (2007). Emotional processing in experiential therapy: 
Why “the only way out is through”. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 75, 
875–887. doi: 10.1037/0022-006x.75.6.875 
Racker, H. (1968). Transference and countertransference. New York: Karnac Books. 
Reading, R. A. (2013). The role of therapist reflective functioning in psychotherapy process 
and outcome (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses 
database. (UMI No. 3566470). 
Rizq, R., & Target, M. (2010). 'If that's what I need, it could be what someone else needs.' 
Exploring the role of attachment and reflective function in counselling psychologists' 
accounts of how they use personal therapy in clinical practice: A mixed methods study. 
British Journal of Guidance & Counselling, 38, 459–481. doi: 
10.1080/03069885.2010.503699 
Rogers, C. R. (1957). The necessary and sufficient conditions of therapeutic personality 
change. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 21, 95–103. doi: 10.1037/h0045357 
Safran, J. D., &  Muran, J. C. (2000). Negotiating the therapeutic alliance: A relational 
treatment guide. New York: Guilford. 
MENTALIZING COUNTERTRANSFERENCE  28 
 
Safran, J., Muran, J. C., Demaria, A., Boutwell, C., Eubanks-Carter, C., & Winston, A. 
(2014). Investigating the impact of alliance-focused training on interpersonal process and 
therapists' capacity for experiential reflection. Psychotherapy Research, 24, 269-285. doi: 
10.1080/10503307.2013.874054 
Séguin, M.-H., & Bouchard, M.-A. (1996). Adaptive regression and countertransference 
mental activity. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 13, 457–474. doi: 10.1037/h0079705 
Stern, D. B. (2010). Partners in thought: Working with unformulated experience, 
dissociation, and enactment. New York: Routledge. 
Stern, D. N., Sander, L. W., Nahum, J. P., Harrison, A. M., Lyons-Ruth, K., Morgan, A. C., . . 
. Tronick, E. Z. (1998). Non-interpretive mechanisms in psychoanalytic therapy: The 
‘something more’ than interpretation. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 79, 903-
921. 
Strachey, J. (1934/1969). The nature of the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis. International 
Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 50, 275-292. 
Tansey, M. J., & Burke, W. F. (1989). Understanding countertransference: From projective 
identification to empathy. Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press. 
Vermote, R. (2005). Touching inner change: Psychoanalytically informed hospitalization-
based treatment of personality disorders. A process-outcome study. Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, Katholieke Universiteit, Leuven, Belgium. 
Wampold, B. E. (2015). How important are the common factors in psychotherapy: An update. 
World Psychiatry, 14, 270-277. doi: 10.1002/wps.20238 
Winnicott, D. W. (1949). Hate in the counter-transference. International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, 30, 69-74. 
Winnicott, D. W. (1971). Playing and reality. New York: Routledge. 
Zachrisson, A. (2009). Countertransference and changes in the conception of the 
psychoanalytic relationship. International Forum of Psychoanalysis, 18, 177–188. doi: 
10.1080/08037060902727761
MENTALIZING COUNTERTRANSFERENCE 29 
Table 1 
Dimensions of ECE 
DIMENSION DESCRIPTION 
LEVEL 
0 1 2 3 4 
EXPERIENCING 
Increasing subjectivation, ownership, 
appropriation, or containment of 
immediate experience 
Detached: absent or remote contact 
with present experience; disengaged, 
impersonal, and objectivistic accounts 
of events or ideas 
 
Disruptive: reactions insufficiently 
integrated; feelings not fully owned; 
subjectivity mostly described as 
legitimate or inevitable consequence 
of external determinants 
 
Containing: experience fully 
recognized, accepted, and explored in 
its subjective quality 
REFLECTIVE ELABORATION 
Effort to explain, organize, or make 
sense 
Description/expression: mere account 
of information, be it a fact or a 
subjective experience 
 
Active meaning-making 
Simple explanation: conclusive 
interpretation of causes, meanings, or 
sources (no awareness of opaqueness 
of mental states evidenced) 
 
Investigation/exploration: open-
ended search for questions and 
meaning as the subject speaks 
EPISTEMIC POSITION 
Experienced relation between 
therapist’s psychic reality and 
external reality (therapeutic process, 
client) 
Equation: feelings, observations, and 
ideas felt as copy or direct 
apprehension of clinical reality 
 
Separation/isolation: concern with 
distinguishing subjective from 
objective aspects of therapist 
perspective; assumption that 
subjective is private and only 
objective is informative 
 
Dialectic: feelings and ideas treated 
as products of dialectic relation to 
reality, thus clinically meaningful 
EXPERIENTIAL GROUNDEDNESS 
Extent to which therapists’ 
observations process/integrate and 
are anchored in concrete aspects of 
experience 
Absent: nothing in therapist speech 
particularizes a lived experience  
Diffuse: therapist tries to report 
something that forces into 
phenomenological field, although it 
cannot be precised 
 
Vivid: speech includes imagetic 
(memories, fantasies...), sensorial 
and/or bodily (somatic, motor) 
elements signaling concrete felt 
experience 
EMOTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION 
Complexity and discriminative 
capacity with which emotional themes 
(from therapist and/or client) are 
treated 
Diffuse/absent: emotional focus 
hardly identifiable; if present, 
emotions mentioned in vague and 
abstract manner, without reference to 
concrete situations 
 
Simple: emotion recognized; 
reference to more than one affect, if 
existent, refers to distinct experiences 
(e.g., different subjects, different 
moments) or presumes mutual 
exclusion (e.g., discerning whether 
client felt one emotion or another) 
 
Complex: internal or relational 
emotional dynamism recognized and 
expressed in detailed, nuanced, and 
subtle accounts; or identification of 
interaction between emotions - 
simultaneous (mixed, conflicting…) 
or in causal sequence - or between 
emotions and other psychological 
processes 
TEMPORAL FOCUS 
Articulation of past and immediate 
perspectives; differentiation and 
integration between past protagonist 
and present narrator perspectives 
Past: omits narrator current 
perspective, focusing exclusively on 
prior events or experiences; includes 
use of “historical present” 
 
Present: reveals point of view held in 
the moment the speech is produced; 
even if reporting to past event, focus 
on current experience and 
apprehension 
 
Present-past: focus oscillates 
between present and past perspectives 
in an effort to compare and integrate 
them 
INTERNAL FOCUSa 
Extent to which internal experience is 
attended to and explored 
Absent: external focus; first person 
scarcely employed 
  
Implicit: predominant external focus, 
but the speech is experiential; evident 
traces of a personal look (e.g., 
frequent use of first person, poetic or 
evaluative language) 
  
Explicit: takes experience as the 
center; external elements used in the 
service of experience 
contextualization and depth 
exploration 
Note. The primary dimensions, imported from the bidimensional model (Figure 1), are in boldface. Scores 1 and 3 may be used to rate intermediate processes lying between level descriptions. 
a We do not imply that therapists should privilege an internal focus in session, but that they should be able to engage in self-exploration when looking back at experiences in session
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Figure 1. Bidimensional model of the elaboration of countertransference experience. 
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